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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THEj CASE
The appellant, Roy M. Helm, appeals from a judgment
entered against him in the Second Judicial District of Utah, the
i

Honorable Thornley K. Swan presiding, following a conviction for
tampering with evidence.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty by a jury on March 26, 1976,
of tampering with evidence in violation of Utah Code Anno., Sec.
76-8-510 (1953), and sentenced April 19, 1&76.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of his Conviction for tampering with evidence or in the alternatuve a determination that the
lower court was without jurisdiction to sentence the appellant
on the date that sentence was imposed and, therefore, the sen-*
tence should be vacated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant stipulated to certain testimony
to be admitted at trial as follows (p. 12-14 TT):
That on the evening of September 4, 1974, Trooper Owen
Busch had probable cause to stop a vehicle in Davis County, State
of Utah; that he stopped the vehicle and oblserved that the driver
was one Willard Eccles; thereafter, Trooper Busch took some notes

pertaining to what he observed; that Trooper Busch recorded the
notes; that Trooper Busch had Mr, Eccles perform some field sobriety
tests, or performance tests, and took notes of what he observed;
that all these notes and others were recorded on forms similar to
plaintiff's Exhibit "A"; that he then took Mr, Eccles in Buschfs
vehicle, turned on a tape recorder and placed Mr. Eccles under
arrest for driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages;
that Officer Busch made arrangements to have Mr, Eccles1 vehicle
impounded for safekeeping and that he radioed for the assistance
of one Sergeant Odell Hatch to come to the scene; that Trooper
Busch then recorded an interview with Mr, Eccles; that Trooper
Busch wrote out a traffic citation to Mr, Eccles for driving under
the influence of intoxicants; that Mr. Eccles showed him a badge
and stated that he was the Chairman of the Highway Patrol Civil
Service Commission; that shortly after this Sergeant Hatch arrived
in his car; that both officers then took Mr. Eccles in Officer
Busch's vehicle to the Davis County Jail for purposes of booking
Mr. Eccles; that on the way to the jail Mr. Eccles stated to the
police officers, "Aren't you afraid of losing your jobs?'1; that
at all times during which Sergeant Hatch participated in the arrest
he was aware that Mr, Eccles was, in fact, the Chairman of the Highway Patrol Civil Service Commission; that Mr. Eccles was, in fact,
Vice President of First Security Bank and had told Officer Busch
that; and finally, that the officers and Mr. Eccles, in fact,
arrived at the jail.
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After this testimony had been stipulated to, Officer
Busch testified that on arrival at the jail Mr. Eccles wished
to use the phone (p. 17 TT); that Mr. Eccles attempted to reach
Commissioner Raymond Jackson but failed toi reach him; that Mr.
Eccles then reached Colonel Helm's home by phone and

spoke with

someone; that 10 minutes later a call came for Mr. Eccles at the
jail; that after Mr. Eccles finished speakingf he handed the phone
to Officer Busch; that Officer Busch could|not remember any part
of the conversation Mr. Eccles had on the $hone; that when Officer
Busch spoke on the phone, he spoke to Colonel Helm,and defendant
stipulated to that fact.
Officer Busch further testified ihat Colonel Helm asked
him to go to another room in the jailhouse to speak to him (p.18 TT);
Colonel Helm asked him if anyone had seen l}im bring Mr, Eccles
into the jailhouse.

When Officer Busch responded in the negative,

Colonel Helm told the Officer Busch to get Mr. Eccles out of the
jailhouse (p. 19 TT).
Officer Busch then testified that he and Officer Hatch
discussed the conversation that Officer Bus|ch had just had with
Colonel Helm and then the two officers took Mr. Eccles in Officer
Buschfs vehicle to the parking lot of Farmeprs State Bank on Fifth
South and about Sixth West in Bountiful, Utfch.
Officer Buschfs testimony was that appellant arrived
at the Farmers State Bank some 10 minutes atter the officers and
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Mr- Eccles had (p, 20 TT) . Officer Busch left his vehicle and
entered appellant's automobile and the two conversed for about
10 minutes.

During the course of the conversation appellant asked

Officer Busch the question, "What do you have on this?ff according
to Officer Busch's testimony Cp« 21 TT)• Officer Busch responded
by returning to his vehicle and retrieving his field notes and
tape recording and bringing them back to Colonel Helm's car.
Officer Busch then testified that after Colonel Helm examined
the notes he asked Officer Busch to request Sergeant Hatch to
speak with Colonel Helm Cp. 22 TT) . Busch layed the notes and
tape on the seat and left*
After Colonel Helm and Sergeant Hatch finished speaking , Officer Busch testified that he rejoined the two men outside
of Colonel Helm*s automobile where the three men decided that
Colonel Helm would handle the situation (pp, 23, 39-41 TT).
Sergeant Hatch testified that shortly thereafter, Mr. Eccles
left Officer Busch's car and the two officers then left the area
(p. 41 TT).
Sergeant Hatch testified that he was aware of the notes
and tape recordings that Officer Busch had accumulated and that
although they were in Officer Busch's car when they were on
their way to the Farmers State Bank in Bountiful, they were not
in the automobile when they left the Farmers State Bank parking
lot (pp. 42, 43 TT).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE COURT
NOT TO HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR DISMISSAL AS A MATTER OF LAW AT THE
CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE BECAUSE THE
STATE DID NOT PROVE ALL THE ELEMENTS
OF ITS CASE.
Defendant, Roy M, Helm, was charged with violation of
Utah Code Ann,, § 76-8-510, which reads in part;
"76-8-510, Tampering with evidence. - A person commits a felony of the second degree if,
believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he;
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, 6r removes
anything with a purpose to impaijf its verity
or availability in the proceeding or investigation; "
It is clear from the face of the statute that some very
critical elements must be established before anyone can be convicted of a violation of this section of tide penal code-

Those

elements are;
1.

That the person believe that ian official proceeding
or investigation is pending qr about to be instituted ;

2.

That there be an altercation, destruction, concealment or removal of evidence;

3.

That there was a specific purpose for those actions;

4.

That the purpose be to impair! the evidence;

5.

That the impairment either alters, destroys, conceals or removes the ver^t^ ofr availability of
the evidence.
- 5 -

As a matter of law the State simply had not met its
burden of introducing evidence on these elements.
As to the first element, the State did not even attempt
to illicit evidence of any kind that an investigation or official
proceeding was

pending when the evidence was allegedly treated

in the fashion described by the second element of the statute
as numbered in this Brief.

On the contrary, all of the evi-

dence given by Officer Busch indicates that the investigation
was over.

Officer Busch had collected all the information that

was required to issue a citation and arrest Mr, Eccles.

The

difference between an investigation and an official proceeding
is that an investigation gathers evidence that can be used in
an official proceeding or to effect an arrest and further, that
an investigation is not a proceeding in which action is taken
against anyone.

People v. Orr, 103 Cal. Rptr. 266, 26 Cal. App. 3d

849 (1972); People v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1085,
98 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1971); Meunier v. Bernich, LA, App,, 170
So. 567 (1936); Bowles v. Baer, C C A , 111, 142 F,2d 787 (1944);
Atchison, T. & S, F, Ry. Co. v. Kansas Commission on Civil Rights,
529 P.2d 666. 215 Kan. 911 (1974); Mason v. Peaslee, 173 Cal. App. 2
587, 343 P.2d 805, p. 808, n.2 (1959),

In any type of proceed-

ing, whether criminal, civil, or administrative, the definition
of investigation is always the same - a procedure for gathering
information or evidence.

It is clear, is it not, that the investi-
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gation in this case was over.

Even if characterized as an offi-

cial proceeding, it was over.

In fact, Sergeant Hatch testified

that only one of two things was done in a traffic case - issue
a ticket or swear out a complaint (p. 44 TT). Officer Busch
testified that he had already issued a ticket, but he did not
file a complaint.

In other words, no investigation was pending

or about to be instituted, nor was any official proceeding pending or about to be instituted, and no evidence was introduced to
show either.
Similarly, the second element of the statute was not
met.

No evidence was introduced to show alteration or destruction

or concealment.

The only evidence introduced was to show that

evidence was moved from one car to another,
Assuming arguendo that the secon4 element is met by
movement of the evidence, it must still be tied to the third
element or intent.

At no point in the tridl does the State proffer

any evidence as to defendant's intent.

Quijte rightly, the legis-

lature did not wish to make all movement of evidence a felony,
but only those with the requisite and avowdd purpose of obstructing justice.

Yet with this clear mandate from the legislature,

the State does not even bother to submit evidence on the issue.
The fourth and fifth elements of the statute are similarly bereft of substantiation.

First of all, no showing has
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been made in any manner that defendant attempted to alter the
verity of the evidence.

To show that the State would almost

have to produce the evidence or in some way submit a comparison
of two conflicting statments or materials,

This was not done.

Furthermore, the only evidence dealing with availability was
that the evidence ended up in defendant^ automobile.

On cross-

examination Officer Busch testified that he had never even asked
the defendant where the evidence was, if he could have it back,
or that anyone had even approached defendant on the subject
(p. 27 TT). What impairment has taken place?

Under the structure

of the statute there could be no impairment without a showing
of intent and none appears in the record.
Appellant, therefore, contends that the State as a
matter of law had not met its burden of proving and,in this case,
of even introducing evidence on the elements of the statute under
which appellant was charged either by a preponderance of the evidence and much less by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Although

arguable that defendant might have been guilty of other offenses,
appellant submits that as a matter of law he was not proven
guilty of the offense charged in this indictment.
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POINT II
EVEN IF THE STATE DID PROVE ALL THE
ELEMENTS OF ITS CASE, IT WAS STILL
REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT
COURT NOT TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR DISMISSAL AS A MATTER Of LAW BECAUSE OFFICER BUSCH, SERGEANT HATCH,
AND DEFENDANT WERE INVOLVED IN A CONSPIRACY AND THEIR TESTIMONY|WAS NOT
CORROBORATED•
A,
The Utah Statute dealing with conspiracy is Section
76-12-1,3, Utah Code Anno, (1953).

At faci value the act not

only requires an agreement, but also an ac^»

Voluntariness

is also required as opposed to forced acquiescence.

But there

is no case law which indicates that a defease to a conspiracy
charge exists because one of the conspirators really didn't
have "his heart in it" or that "really" in his heart he objected
but felt obligated by a superior order of the
this case.

kind alleged in

If the Vietnam War has taught this country anything,

it is that Mai Lai stands for the proposition that no superior
officer can issue any command which is against the law and a
junior officer be forced or feel obligated to follow that command.

If he does, the junior is as guilty as his superior,

Although at Mai Lai this country was faced jwith acts of murder,
there is no reason to not treat a felony of| miscarriage or
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interference with justice in any different mannerf

In essence,

the State attempted to excuse the conspiracy on the basis that
the junior officers felt obligated to carry out commands which
were against the law.

The tenor of all the testimony, fairly

viewed, indicates that the two officers were, at the very least,
conscious stricken about their actions.

If this defense is

allowed to resist the allegation of conspiracy, appellant submits
that the people of Utah are at the mercy of any public official
who wishes to be corrupt because their subordinates must follow
their commands without objection.

The integrity of our system

of justice will be seriously impaired and respect by the people
of Utah for law enforcement will be seriously affected.
Officer Busch not only conspired in this crimer if in
fact one occurred, but delayed filing a complaint for more than
15 months.

It was he who carried his own accumulated evidence

to Colonel Helm's car.

He knew where the evidence was and yet

at no time, including December, 1975/when Mr, Eccles was finally
charged, did he make any attempt to locate it or have it returned.
Similarly, Sergeant Hatch knew that evidence was in the patrol
car before they arrived at the Farmers State Bank parking lot,
knew what the evidence was, and knew that the evidence was not
in the patrol car when they left the scene.

Whether he knew

that Colonel Helm had the evidence or that Officer Busch disposed
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of it is immaterial.

Something was amiss if we are to believe

his evidence and yet he kept silent and ca|lied it to no one's
attention.
Furthermore, both officers testified that they spoke
together with Colonel Helm and for whatever reason--and in this
case the hollow ring of weak integrity—agreed that Colonel Helm
would handle the matter; in fact, both testified that they indicated they would not be offended if ColonejL Helm proceeded with
the case, but defend now with testimonies <pf tortured conscience
and feelings of duty to the Colonel.
15A C.J.S. 756, Conspiracy, § 45^ has an appropriate
response to this sort of weak and inappropriate defense:
"...an assertion that there has been a failure
to prove a corrupt motive on the part of one
of the conspirators who participated in an unlawful act does not necessarily warrant the direction of a verdict of acquittal as to him. The
fact that the motive of a party was not corrupt
when he joined a conspiracy does not exculpate
him if he remains a member thereof after learning of its illegality, since it i[s his duty, after
learning of the criminal nature of the scheme,
to take some definite and positive step to
withdraw from the venture. (emphasis added)
1

To be a member of a conspiracy one must
have a knowledge of the conspiracy and of
its object or purpose during its [continuance,
since without such knowledge a criminal intent cannot exist. So, to constitute the
criminal intent necessary to establish a conspiracy to commit an act prohibited by statute,
there must be both knowledge of the existence
of the law and knowledge of its actual or
intended violation, but, where the act to

- 11 -

be committed is in its very nature wrongful,
knowledge of the prohibitory statute is not
essential,ft
Numerous authorities are listed for these statements
of the law, and appellant submits that Utah law is not apposite.
Certainly ignorance of the purpose of the conspiracy may be a
defense, but that has not even been alleged in this case.
One case, State v, Fertig, 120 Utah 224, 233 P.2d 347
(1951) , contains language which might be interpreted as indicating
that the co-conspirator must have his whole soul in the project.
"However, the cooperation in the crime must
be real, not merely apparent, and mere presence combined with knowledge that a crime
is about to be committed or a mental approbation while the will contributes nothing
to the doing of the act will not of itself
constitute one an accomplice." (emphasis
added)
Although such language might seem to require actual
mental acquiescence in a total complete heartfelt manner; that
is not the law.
an act of sodomy.
accomplice.
here.

In that case the accused co-conspirator watched
She did not participate.

She was not an

As the evidence will show, that is not the case

As a matter of law the Court should have ruled that a

conspiracy existed in this case.
B.
The corroborating evidence must do more than cause a
grave doubt upon the defendant, State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365,
120 P.2d 285 (1941); State v. Lay, 38 Utah 143, 110 P. 986;
- 12 -

State v. Butterfield, 70 Utah 529, 261 P, 804; State v. Park,
44 Utah 360, 140 P. 768; State v. Kimball, 45 Utah 443, 146 P.
313; State v. Powell, 45 Utah 193, 143 P, 588; State v. Cox,
74 Utah 149, 277 P, 972? State v. Gardner] 83 Utah 145, 27 P.2d
51.
In State v. Baran, 25 Ut,2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 (1970)
the Court said:
"In State v. Sinclair this Court stated that
the proper test to determine the sufficiency
of the corroborating evidence was whether there
was evidence independent of the testimony of
the accomplice, which the jury could reasonably
believe tended to implicate and connect the defendant with the commission of the crime." 474
P.2d at 729.
In Baran, supra, outside witnesses could corroborate
the testimony.

State v. Pratt, 25 Ut.2d 76, 475 P.2d 1013 (1970);

State v. Christean, Utah, 533 P.2d 872 (19t5);

State

v. Clark, 3 Ut.2d 382, 284 P.2d 700 (1955); State v. Woodall,
6 Ut.2d 8, 305 P.2d 473 (1956); State v. Sinclair, 15 Ut.2d 162,
389 P.2d 465 (1964).

In other cases the defendant himself has

corroborated the evidence:

Christean, supra; State v. Bruner,

106 Utah 49, 145 P.2d 302 (1944); State v, Erwin, supra.
In the case at bar no corroborating evidence exists•
Appellant did not testify nor make any statements to police that
were introduced into evidence.

Furthermore, the only third party

in this case was Captain John Rogers who would have verified
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the conversation between himself and Sergeant Hatch indicating
that Mr. Eccles was making calls and that Captain Rogers told
the officer to proceed with his case.

Nothing corroborates

even the least signigicant element of tampering with evidence.
Appellant, therefore, submits that the lower court as
a matter of law should have dismissed the suit at the end of the
State's case because as a matter of law a conspiracy was proven
by the testimony adduced and there was no corroborating evidence and no issue of fact on these questions was left for the
jury to decide.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO SENTENCE THE APPELLANT,
The statute with respect to sentencing is 77-35-1,
Utah Code Anno., (1953), and reads in pertinent parts;
"After a verdict of guilty, if judgment is
not arrested...the Court must appoint a
time for pronouncing judgment, which must
be at least two days and not more than ten
days after the verdict." (emphasis added)
In Herr v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 525 P.2d 728 (1974)
the Utah Supreme Court had occasion to discuss the meaning of
the word "shall" and following a United States Supreme Court
case, Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 67 S. Ct. 428, 91 L. Ed.
436 (19 46), equated the word "shall" with the meaning of the
word "must" which the Court held was a word of command and not
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advisory.

Although the Herr case is civil, it is difficult if

not impossible to determine why a greater jpower should be given
the word in a civil case to preserve a defendant's rights as
opposed to a criminal case in which defendantfs rights are so
much more deeply affected and destroyed ifi not strictly protected.
It is true that the courts of Utfch have held in the
past that this statute is merely advisory fcnd not jurisdictional,
State v. Fedder, 1 Ut«2d 117, 262 P.2d 753 (1953); State v.
Saxton, 30 Ut.2d 456, 519 P.2d 1340 (1974)t
that the law has changed.

Appellant submits

In Saxtonf defendant absented himself

to avoid the penalty of law and in Fedder defendant consented
to the delay.

Neither situation is true in this case.

In fact,

in this case defendant was not even aware that the time for
sentencing had been postponed.
Appellant submits that the circumstances of this case
distinguish it from Sax ton and Fedder and tlhat in light of Kerr
the meaning of the word

,f

mustn is a command! and, therefore, the

Court lost jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits the State did not prove or even
submit evidence on all the elements of its case and that the
Court should have ruled as a matter of law in defendant's favor,
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Furthermore, if the Court felt that sufficient evidence was presented to go to the jury, it should have ruled as a matter of
law that there was a conspiracy and absent corroborating evidence , dismissed the charge.

Lastly, appellant contends that

the Court lost jurisdiction to sentence appellant, and that this
Court should so find,
illy submitted,

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
370 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
364-6474
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief
to Attorney General of Utah, State of Utah, Utah State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84104, this 16th day of December,
1976, postage prepaid.

lobfert M. McRae
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